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This might be sufficient to convince any reasonable person that as it was not in the power 
of the magistrates or of any human methods of policy, to prevent the spreading the 
infection, so that this way of shutting up of houses was perfectly insufficient for that end. 
Indeed it seemed to have no manner of public good in it, equal or proportionable to the 
grievous burden that it was to the particular families that were so shut up; and, as far as I 
was employed by the public in directing that severity, I frequently found occasion to see 
that it was incapable of answering the end […] In the execution of this office I could not 
refrain speaking my opinion among my neighbours as to this shutting up the people in 
their houses; in which we saw most evidently the severities that were used, though 
grievous in themselves, had also this particular objection against them: namely, that they 
did not answer the end, as I have said, but that the distempered people went day by day 
about the streets; and it was our united opinion that a method to have removed the sound 
from the sick, in case of a particular house being visited, would have been much more 
reasonable on many accounts, leaving nobody with the sick persons but such as should on 
such occasion request to stay and declare themselves content to be shut up with them. 
     
—Daniel Defoe, A Journal of the Plague Year, 1722 
        
 
1. Introduction 
Over the course of several publications, we have developed an argument that epistemic 
considerations are logically basic in human decision-making and an analysis of the effects of 
relevant ignorance on the decision-making process. In “Ignorance and the Incentive Structure 
Confronting Policymakers,” Scheall (2019) argues that the nature and extent of policymakers’ 
ignorance – their epistemic burdens – with respect to various policy objectives serve to 
determine what counts as an option worth consciously considering and where options are ranked 
in policymakers’ incentive structures. In “Epistemic Burdens and the Incentives of Surrogate 
Decision-makers,” Crutchfield and Scheall (2019) extend this analysis to other surrogate 
decision-making contexts where some person(s) must decide on behalf and ostensibly in the 
interests of some other person(s). In “The Priority of the Epistemic,” Scheall and Crutchfield 
(2020) develop this analysis further and argue that the incentive-determining nature of ignorance 
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is a fully general fact about human decision-making. In F. A. Hayek and the Epistemology of 
Politics, Scheall (2020) considers the methodological significance for political analysis of 
ignorance, defends a methodology that assumes the ignorance of political decision-makers, and 
attributes a proto-version of this methodology to the Austrian economists, Ludwig von Mises and 
F. A. Hayek.  
One response that we have occasionally received to this work is that its deeply 
philosophical (not to mention, psychological) nature somewhat obscures its practical 
significance. Some case studies are needed that illustrate both the effects of ignorance on 
decision-making in the real world and, thus, the significance of our analysis. We aim to begin to 
remedy this deficiency in the present paper.  
We apply our analysis to political decision-making during the COVID-19 pandemic. We 
argue that several of the implications of the problem of policymaker ignorance – “the simple and, 
once it is first recognized, obvious fact that what can be deliberately achieved through political 
action is necessarily constrained by the nature and extent of policymakers’ ignorance, and their 
capabilities for learning” (Scheall 2019, p. 39) – have been on display during the pandemic. In 
particular, policymakers have aimed at goals that are relatively less epistemically burdensome 
than objectives that they might have otherwise tried to realize. Rather than trying to minimize 
overall (or all-things-considered) – human suffering from both the virus itself and policy 
responses to it, policymakers have aimed primarily to mitigate physical suffering due to the virus 
and have mostly ignored the economic, sociological, psychological, and physical suffering due to 
their policy responses. Similarly, rather than adopting a focused-protection policy that would 
have required the identification and isolation of uniquely vulnerable patient populations, 
policymakers have opted to try to minimize physical suffering due to the virus via the blunt and 
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comparatively simplistic tool of economic and societal lockdown. If our analysis is sound, then 
ignorance is an essential part of any explanation of these and other political decisions that have 
been taken during the pandemic.  
 
2. The Logical Priority of the Problem of Policymaker Ignorance 
In order to explain the decisions of policymakers in response to the COVID-19 pandemic 
declared by the World Health Organization on March 11, 2020, it is important to understand the 
role that ignorance plays in human decision-making. We have argued in a number of previous 
works that ignorance is logically prior to moral, prudential, pecuniary, and other normative 
considerations in decision-making (Scheall 2019; Crutchfield and Scheall 2019; Scheall and 
Crutchfield 2020; Scheall 2020; Crutchfield, Scheall, Rzeszutek, Brown, and Cardoso Sao 
Mateus Manuscript).1 The fundamental problem of politics is not that policymakers may be 
                                                        
1 We offer two arguments for the thesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. According to the 
first, introspection reveals that the options persons consciously consider in any given decision 
context have been pre-consciously filtered and sorted according to the nature and extent of their 
relevant ignorance. According to the second, philosophers (and others) are presumably interested 
in determining the correct logical relationship between ought and can, at least in part, because 
knowledge of the correct relationship could be put to work for practical purposes, i.e., to 
segregate potential obligations (potential “oughts”) from non-obligations. We argue that, if this is 
right, then whatever the logical relationship between ought and can, if knowledge of this 
relationship is ever to be put to use for practical purposes, it must be that “can” means 
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inadequately motivated to pursue policy objectives in constituents’ interests. The fundamental 
problem of politics is that even if policymakers’ motivations align with their constituents’ 
interests, policymakers may not possess the knowledge necessary to deliberately realize relevant 
policy objectives (Scheall 2019; Scheall 2020). This is the problem of policymaker ignorance: 
ultimately, the policy objectives that can be deliberately realized are limited by the nature and 
extent of policymaker ignorance.2 Beyond the limits of policymaker knowledge lie policy 
                                                        
deliberately can. However, “deliberately can” just means knows enough to. Thus, the criteria of 
potential oughts and non-oughts is ultimately epistemic.  
 In addition to these introspective and philosophical arguments, in Crutchfield, Scheall, 
Rzeszutek, Brown, and Cardoso Sao Mateus (Manuscript), we offer empirical evidence from two 
psychological experiments that supports the thesis of the logical priority of the epistemic.  
2 We use incentives and motivations synonymously to indicate persons’ reasons for acting. For 
our purposes, policymakers include everyone directly involved in the processes of deciding, 
designing, implementing, and administering policies, including elected and unelected officials, 
and the so-called “experts” that often advise them. Constituents are those persons in whose 
interests policymakers ostensibly make policies, which are sets of rules enacted (ostensibly) for 
the sake of constituents, who are supposed to conform to them, ostensibly in their own interests. 
A policy can thus be anything from, say, the ordinances of a local homeowners’ association to a 
constitutional plan for interplanetary government. Policymakers can be constituents: as far as the 
rule of law obtains, they are subject to the policies they make. In democracies, constituents can 
be policymakers to the extent that their votes figure in the policymaking process. Nothing of 
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objectives that can be realized only if luck, fortune, or other spontaneous forces of the 
appropriate kind(s) intervene to an adequate extent.3  
                                                        
substance for the present analysis hinges on the fact that the relevant categories are not mutually 
disjoint.  
3 A policy goal can be realized only if 1) at the time the policy is designed and implemented, and 
at every moment in its subsequent administration, deliberate realization of the goal falls under 
the ken and control of policymakers, i.e., policymakers possess all of the knowledge that 
deliberate realization of the goal requires, or 2) in the process of trying to realize the goal on an 
initially epistemically-deficient basis, deliberate realization of the goal comes under the ken and 
control of policymakers, i.e., policymakers learn whatever relevant knowledge they happen to 
lack, or 3) the required kinds of spontaneous forces beyond the ken and control of policymakers 
intervene to compensate for the goal-undermining consequences of their ignorance, i.e., the goal 
emerges despite policymaker ignorance. The latter two possibilities are not mutually exclusive 
with respect to each other, though each is mutually exclusive with respect to the first: the goal 
might be realized through a combination of improved policymaker knowledge or through the 
intervention of other spontaneous forces, but only if policymaker knowledge is not already 
adequate, in which case the goal can be realized directly and deliberately, without the need for 
learning or for the intervention of other spontaneous forces. Given that we can never know in 
advance the content of what we might learn in the future (or we would already know that 
content), the acquisition of new knowledge is guided by spontaneous forces. In other words, 
policymakers cannot plan or design to learn the absent knowledge required to realize a policy 
goal.  
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The logical priority of the political-ignorance problem to the political-incentive problem 
is manifest in the fact that relevant ignorance can distort related incentives, motivations, reasons 
for acting, etc., but that motivations cannot alter the nature and extent of one’s relevant ignorance 
(Scheall 2019; Scheall and Crutchfield 2020; Scheall 2020). The epistemic burden of a course of 
action is all of the missing knowledge, both knowledge-that and knowledge-how, that a decision-
maker needs to acquire (i.e., to learn) in order to deliberately realize the goal of the action 
(Scheall 2019; Scheall and Crutchfield 2020).4 Courses of action with respect to which a 
decision-maker is relatively ignorant, i.e., courses of action that bear comparatively heavy 
epistemic burdens, either do not appear to her as options worth consciously considering or are 
discounted relative to courses of action with respect to which she is more knowledgeable. One 
who recognizes that they lack adequate knowledge to X faces a lesser incentive to X, other things 
equal, than one who knows that their knowledge is adequate to X; however, a strong motivation 
to X cannot affect one’s ignorance regarding X. That one does not know how to fly like a bird 
makes courses of action that require flying like a bird less, if at all, attractive; that one may have 
many reasons to want to fly like a bird cannot make one any less ignorant with respect to it.  
More to the present point, even if policymakers’ motivations align with their 
constituents’ interests, the comparative epistemic burdens of constituent-minded policies might 
                                                        
4 The epistemic burden of a course of action should not be confused with the epistemic costs of 
an action. Epistemic costs are incurred in the process of attempting to overcome epistemic 
burdens, i.e., in the process of trying to learn or acquire the missing knowledge, but there is no 
necessary or direct relationship between epistemic burdens and epistemic costs. Just as a given 
distance might be traversed in a more or less costly fashion, so might a given epistemic burden.   
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be so heavy that such policies either do not appear to policymakers as worth conscious 
consideration or are discounted relative to other, less epistemically burdensome – and less 
constituent-minded – policies. Even if policymakers want nothing more than to be constituent-
minded, they may not know enough to be constituent-minded, so they will not be (except by 
accident or spontaneously, as it were).  
Policymakers who know that they do not know enough to realize a policy goal are, other 
things equal, discouraged from pursuing the goal and are incented instead to pursue other goals 
that they take to be more within their ken and control. We have argued elsewhere that when 
policymakers know that they do not know enough to realize a policy objective in constituents’ 
interests, but know that they know enough to engage in a media charade to appear to be 
pursuing constituent-minded objectives, policymakers will tend to flatter to deceive their 
constituents (Scheall 2019; Scheall 2020). In other words, policymakers will tend to feign or 
pretend to pursue the constituent-minded objective, knowing that many constituents will not be 
able to distinguish earnest from pretended pursuit of the goal and that, for some constituents at 
least, seeming to pursue the goal is almost as important as realizing it.  
If this analysis is sound, then it implies that, inasmuch as policymakers have recognized 
their ignorance of some relevant knowledge, policy responses to COVID-19 have been more 
political theater than earnest attempts to realize constituent-minded objectives. Policymakers 
may have not known enough to limit all-things-considered suffering from the virus (and from 
their attempts to limit suffering from the virus), but they have unquestionably known enough to 
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use the media to promote the appearance that they are trying to limit suffering from the virus.5 
However, even if it is not the case that policymakers have purposefully playacted at constituent-
mindedness during the pandemic, that they have recognized they are too ignorant to deliberately 
realize the relevant goal implies that they have tended to do other things rather than earnestly 
pursue the constituent-minded objective of limiting overall suffering from both the virus and 
their policy responses to it. Some of the policy measures adopted have been chosen because they 
were comparatively less epistemically burdensome than the alternatives and not because 
policymakers earnestly believed these measures likely to contribute much to minimizing 
suffering. Of course, that these policy measures may also have appeared to some constituents as 
earnest attempts to limit suffering is all to the benefit of policymakers.  
Like all actors, policymakers are incented to pursue relatively less epistemically 
burdensome goals, other things equal. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, they have 
mostly acted accordingly. Ignorance is a necessary and is, in fact, we argue, the fundamental 
factor in any explanation of the policy decisions taken in the wake of the pandemic, especially 
the near-unanimous decisions of policymakers to lock economies down and to issue de facto (if 
                                                        
5 We are all by now familiar with the phenomenon of televised briefings in which presidents and 
prime ministers, state and provincial governors, and an array of their respective health advisors, 
glorify their efforts to combat the novel coronavirus and endlessly signal their exclusive, and all-
encompassing, care for their constituents. 
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not necessarily de jure) compulsory stay-at-home orders for all but “essential” workers instead of 
engaging in more limited, and focused, virus containment and patient-protection strategies.6   
 
                                                        
6 Such as the policy of “focused protection” associated with the, by now, infamous Great 
Barrington Declaration. See https://gbdeclaration.org.  
It is telling that a common objection to a policy of focused protection is the allegedly 
greater difficulty, as opposed to blanket lockdown measures, involved in implementing and 
enforcing it (See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/03/chris-whitty-decries-great-
barrington-plan-to-let-covid-run-wild; https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-54802129; 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-britain-whitty-idUKKBN27J2CQ). It should 
be noted that, from the perspective of the problem of policymaker ignorance, all of the 
difficulties that policymakers confront with regard to such a policy are ultimately epistemic in 
nature. There may be, for example, apparently logistical or legal constraints that seem to 
complicate a focused-protection policy. However, if policymakers knew how to remove or 
otherwise avoid them, such constraints would not complicate a more focused policy. All 
constraints on policies that policymakers do not know enough to remove or avoid are ultimately 
epistemic constraints, due to relevant policymaker ignorance. If policymakers knew how to deal 
with them, they wouldn’t be constraints. 
Nothing in the present paper should be construed as a normative defense of a policy of 
focused protection. Our interest is to explain why certain kinds of policies were chosen and why 
other kinds of policies were mostly ignored, not to defend any of these policies as either uniquely 
appropriate to relevant circumstances or morally defensible. 
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3. Policymaker Ignorance at the Start of the Pandemic 
The COVID-19 pandemic would seem to be a case, if there ever was one, where the interests of 
policymakers were prima facie well-aligned with those of their constituents. At least, there is no 
reason to assume a priori that the initial concerns of policymakers regarding the virus and its 
effects diverged from those of their constituents. It seems reasonable to assume that no one, 
neither policymakers nor constituents, wished to incur on their watch or otherwise suffer either 
the direct health effects of the virus, or the deleterious societal aftereffects of policy responses to 
the virus. It was apparently in the interests of both policymakers and constituents to mitigate all-
things-considered suffering from both the virus and policy responses to the virus. However, the 
problem of policymaker ignorance implies that the relative epistemic burdens that policymakers 
confronted with regard to this goal, as compared to the epistemic burdens of other possible 
policy pursuits, served to determine the policies they pursued.  
The epistemic burdens of policymakers, such as they were at the time the pandemic was 
declared, with respect to deliberately realizing the constituent-minded goal of minimizing overall 
human suffering from both the virus and policy responses to the virus would seem to have been 
quite heavy, indeed.7 What was at stake was not merely the comparatively simple (if still 
complicated) objective of limiting suffering from the direct health effects of the virus, but the 
grotesquely complex goal of both limiting suffering from the virus and, at the same time, 
limiting suffering from the socioeconomic and other aftereffects of efforts (political or 
                                                        
7 We will simply note in passing the obvious part that policymaker ignorance played in failing to 
prevent the transmission of the virus from a localized event to a global pandemic.  
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otherwise) to limit suffering from the virus.8 In order to deliberately realize this goal without 
assistance from learning, luck, fortune, or other spontaneous forces, policymakers needed 
knowledge adequate to the degree of social control required to bring about the constituent-
minded result. 
 In particular, they needed sufficient theoretical knowledge from both the health sciences 
and the social sciences. Policymakers needed theories and models developed by medical 
researchers adequate to the kind and degree of social control required to deliberately realize the 
goal of minimizing suffering due to the direct health effects of COVID-19; and policymakers 
needed models developed by economists and other social scientists sufficient to minimize 
suffering caused by policies aimed to minimize suffering due to the direct health effects of the 
virus.  
Of course, this problem was exacerbated by the fact of disagreement in the relevant fields 
about the adequacy of competing theories and models. As it happened, policymakers had access 
                                                        
8 On the aftereffects of policy responses to the pandemic, especially economic lockdowns and 
stay-at-home orders, see https://collateralglobal.org. That victims of economic dissolution are 
susceptible to negative health effects and to further deleterious consequences beyond the 
narrowly pecuniary is well-documented. Job loss correlates with higher rates of depression, 
suicide, substance abuse, homicide victimization, and poorer overall health-related quality-of-life 
(Milner, Page, and LaFontaine 2014; Pharr, Moonie, and Bungum 2012; Blakely, Collins, and 
Atkinson 2003; Lin and Chen 2018; Brugera, et al 2018; Kposowa and Johnson 2016; Norström, 
et al 2019; Martikainen and Valkonen 1996; Brand 2015). The suffering of the unemployed 
relates not only to concern for their livelihoods, but relates also to concern for their lives.  
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to various theories of public health and epidemiological models that aimed to predict the health 
effects of the virus, especially the number of deaths that would ensue.9 They also had access to 
social-scientific theories that implied some, if perhaps not all, of the societal aftereffects of 
different policy interventions. However, policymakers would seem to have lacked the meta-
theoretical knowledge required to choose appropriately from the rival theories and models in the 
relevant fields. 
Two different, if intimately related, kinds of meta-theoretical knowledge were required. 
First, policymakers needed meta-theoretical knowledge concerning the predictive adequacy of 
theories in each field, i.e., they needed criteria for choosing an epidemiological model that 
yielded adequate predictions of relevant health-related phenomena, as well as criteria for 
choosing social science theories that yielded adequate predictions of relevant social phenomena, 
and they needed criteria for choosing models from each field that could be combined to yield 
theoretical knowledge adequate to the kind and degree of social control necessary to deliberately 
realize the goal of minimizing overall human suffering. In other words, policymakers needed to 
know that there were theories that could be combined in the required way and which of the 
extant theories satisfied this requirement. Second, given such theories and models from the 
relevant scientific fields, policymakers needed meta-theoretical knowledge concerning how these 
theories could be combined to realize the relevant goal, i.e., they needed another meta-theory of 
                                                        
9 On these models, see https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01003-6. For criticism of 
many such models, see https://forecasters.org/blog/2020/06/14/forecasting-for-covid-19-has-
failed/ 
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how epidemiological and socioeconomic phenomena interact. Policymakers needed to know how 
such theories could be combined in the required way. 
If some combination of the extant public-health and social-scientific models was 
adequate to deliberately realize the goal of mitigating overall human suffering from both the 
virus and political responses to it, policymakers could not have identified this combination 
without the required meta-theoretical criteria of choice. It is not obvious where such meta-
theoretical knowledge could have been found among the modern hyper-specialized sciences.10 
Policy “experts,” such as they are, tend to be knowledgeable about the phenomena investigated 
by their respective specialized disciplines, knowledge they have acquired on the basis of ceteris 
paribus assumptions. There are relatively few, if any, policy experts about what happens when 
other things are not equal, when interaction and integration occur among phenomena as diverse 
                                                        
10 The complexity of the problem that policymakers confronted in trying to minimize overall 
suffering is manifest in the fact that the relevant meta-theories are not independent. The 
epidemiological model that is most predictively adequate in isolation, may not be predictively 
adequate, when integrated with the economic model that is most predictively adequate in 
isolation, and vice versa. Policies built on a particular epidemiological (economic) model might 
lead to societal (public-health) consequences that necessitate the choice of a different economic 
(epidemiological) model than would be appropriate were only societal (public-health) 
considerations pertinent. The meta-theoretical criteria of an appropriate epidemiological 
(economic) model might depend on the economic (epidemiological) model chosen. Similarly, 
adequately integrating two given epidemiological and economic models might depend on the 
compatibility of the models chosen and, thus, on the criteria of their choice. 
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as those investigated by epidemiology and economics. If this is right, then policymakers could 
only have stumbled upon an appropriate combination of theoretical knowledge from the health 
and social sciences accidentally, as it were, either via learning or through the intervention of 
other spontaneous forces.  
 The epistemic difficulties of policymakers otherwise inclined to aim at mitigating overall 
suffering from the pandemic did not end at their ignorance of the required (meta-) theoretical 
knowledge. Assuming all of this theoretical knowledge to be given to policymakers, they still 
needed empirical data concerning relevant phenomena that could be plugged into the given 
models to yield predictions adequate to the nature and degree of social control required to 
deliberately minimize overall suffering. Perhaps most important in this regard, policymakers 
required empirical knowledge concerning the susceptibility of various populations to infection 
and the variable symptomaticity of different populations. In other words, they needed accurate 
data concerning who was more or less likely to get the virus, and how patients might suffer from 
it once infected. Similarly, they needed empirical data concerning the susceptibility of different 
populations to the societal (and indirect health) aftereffects of various policy options: they 
needed to know who would suffer economically and along other relevant societal dimensions,  
and how badly they would suffer from various potential policy decisions. 
Beyond this, given sufficient theoretical and empirical knowledge, policymakers still 
required the ability – the knowledge how – to manipulate relevant causal factors in such a way as 
to bring about the desired result. In effect, they needed to know how to control the course of 
events in the way implied by the predictions drawn from the conjunction of given theoretical and 
empirical knowledge. Without all of this knowledge, policymakers could not have negotiated a 
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path to the constituent-minded result of minimizing overall suffering without learning, luck, 
fortune, or other spontaneous forces beyond their ken and control.  
 The spontaneous forces that might have intervened to either assist or foil the pursuit of 
the relevant goal would seem to have been of three kinds: 1) forces that might have either 
improved or degraded policymakers’ epistemic position relative to the required knowledge; 2) 
forces emerging from the private initiative of constituents, acting individually or collectively, 
that could have either manifested or prevented the manifestation of effective means of 
approaching the constituent-minded goal, such as a vaccine, a convalescent antibody serum, an 
effective antiviral therapy, improved varieties of personal protective equipment, or methods of 
selectively protecting those most vulnerable to COVID-19; 3) forces emerging from the natural 
progression of the virus through the population, i.e., forces that might have either hastened or 
hindered the emergence of community (or “herd”) immunity.  
The question of the relevant knowledge that policymakers actually possessed and of their 
comparative epistemic burdens at the start of the pandemic relative to the goal of minimizing 
overall human suffering is left as an exercise for the reader. Unless the reader can convince 
herself that policymakers possessed all of the required knowledge at the time the pandemic was 
declared, she must recognize the effect that this ignorance had on policymakers’ incentives, 
motivations, and reasons for acting and, thus, on their policy decisions. It was not that, at the 
start of the pandemic, policymakers wanted anything other than to minimize overall suffering. At 
least, there is no reason to assume a priori that their reasons for acting initially failed to cohere 
with their constituents’ interests. Rather, they did not possess all of the epistemic resources 
required to make the sort of rational tradeoff between the health effects of the virus and the 
aftereffects of policies aimed at limiting the health effects of the virus that an effective policy of 
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minimizing overall human suffering required. Policymakers simply did not know how to realize 
the constituent-minded goal and, recognizing that their epistemic burdens were impossibly heavy 
in this regard, they mostly opted to aim to minimize only physical suffering due to the negative 
health effects directly caused by the virus and to largely neglect suffering caused by the 
aftereffects of their policies, while using the media to endlessly signal their constituent-
mindedness. 
A complementary explanation, one still in keeping with the priority of the problem of 
ignorance to that of incentives, is that some policymakers at least believed their own rhetoric and 
convinced themselves that they did know enough to act effectively in their constituents’ interests. 
Unlike policymakers who recognize their ignorance and, so, are inclined to pursue other, less 
epistemically burdensome, goals, policymakers who are ignorant of their ignorance falsely 
believe that they are knowledgeable enough to realize relevant goals and, thus, are (other things 
equal) incented to pursue them (Scheall 2019; Scheall 2020). This “pretence of knowledge” (as 
Hayek [(1975) 2014] called it), i.e., ignorance of their relevant ignorance, incents policymakers 
to policy pursuits that they would be less inclined to pursue if they recognized their actually 
deficient epistemic circumstances. That is, policymakers who are ignorant of their ignorance are 
artificially attracted to policies that, unless spontaneous forces compensate for the goal-defeating 
consequences of their ignorance, are destined not only to fail but perhaps also to aggravate 
relevant circumstances.  
A similar analysis can be given of the near-unanimous decisions of policymakers to try to 
minimize physical suffering from the health effects of the virus by mandating compulsory stay-
at-home orders instead of by a policy of focused protection. Simply put, the epistemic burdens of 
a focused-protection policy were much heavier than those of total lockdown. The theoretical 
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knowledge, empirical data, and know-how required to implement and enforce a policy of 
identifying and protecting individual members of uniquely vulnerable populations were far more 
extensive than the knowledge required to, as it were, simply turn out the economic lights.  
 
4. Policymaker Ignorance in the Wake of Lockdown 
At the time of this writing, we are ten months from the declaration of the pandemic and the 
subsequent implementation in many countries and locales of compulsory stay-at-home orders, 
and other lockdown measures. Considerable evidence has emerged over this time that such 
policies have done little to minimize physical suffering from the health effects of the virus 
(Chaudhry, et al 2020; Chin, et al 2020; Bendavid, et al 2021).11 Yet, at the time of this writing, 
policymakers in several countries, states, provinces, and municipalities have implemented new or 
renewed former lockdowns. An apparent problem for the argument advanced here thus seems to 
emerge: Why have policymakers not learned that these policies are ineffective means of 
minimizing physical suffering from the health effects of the virus and adapted accordingly, 
especially given the fact – which has always been obvious – of their deleterious societal 
aftereffects? Why do policymakers continue to try the same lockdown measures over and over 
again, rather than looking for potentially more effective alternatives? 
 As suggested above with regard to an earlier context, it is possible that some 
policymakers have been lulled into a pretence of knowledge concerning the effectiveness of 
                                                        
11 For a list of over thirty papers showing little, if any, positive effect of lockdown policies, 
including the papers cited in the text, see 
https://inproportion2.talkigy.com/do_lockdowns_work_2021-01-15.html. 
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lockdowns and, thus, that they have been more incented to pursue them than they would be if 
they acknowledged and appreciated the scientific evidence concerning their ineffectiveness. 
Perhaps some pro-lockdown politicians have come to believe (albeit falsely, if the scientific 
evidence is sound) that lockdowns are effective means of minimizing physical suffering from the 
health effects of the virus and their incentives have accordingly been distorted in favor of further 
lockdowns.  
This may be true in some cases, but another explanation, still in keeping with the priority 
of the problem of policymaker ignorance, suggests itself. Once policymakers commit to a 
particular policy, the epistemic burdens that are relevant moving forward may be radically 
different from those that were relevant before a decision was made. Past policy decisions affect 
present and future epistemic burdens. In particular, unless policymakers know how to both alter 
the chosen policy course and avoid the consequences of acknowledging its ineffectiveness, the 
alternative of doubling-down on the existing policy is comparatively attractive. Thus, inasmuch 
as shifting course away from lockdown measures would mean acknowledging their 
ineffectiveness – and, thus, admitting that policymakers erred in implementing them in the first 
place, causing (or failing to avoid) more suffering than was necessary – something that 
policymakers do not know how to do painlessly, the priority of the problem of policymaker 
ignorance serves to explain the continuing political attractiveness of lockdown policies, despite 
the evidence of their ineffectiveness. 
This problem would seem to have been exacerbated by the near-unanimous and, for all 
practical purposes, “once-size-fits-all,” nature of the lockdown policies implemented around the 
world. In principle and perhaps also in practice, policymakers could have used the pandemic as 
an opportunity to naturally experiment on a variety of virus-containment and patient-protection 
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strategies in order to discover more and less effective means of minimizing human suffering. 
Instead, those relatively few locales, such as Sweden and South Dakota, that adopted less 
restrictive policies have been treated by pro-lockdown policymakers and their media 
cheerleaders as either idiotic grandma-killing pariahs or, more relevant to the present point, too 
culturally unique for their experiences to falsify the effectiveness of severe lockdown policies.  
In effect, once policymakers committed to lockdowns in the spring of 2020, new relevant 
circumstances emerged and the goalposts shifted. The circumstances that policymakers 
confronted before committing to lockdown policies were radically altered once they made that 
commitment. The relevant goal was no longer the relatively simple (if still complicated) goal of 
minimizing physical suffering from the health effects of the virus, but the massively more 
complex goal of minimizing physical suffering from the health effects of the virus while refusing 
to acknowledge that their past policy decisions failed to minimize physical suffering from the 
health effects of the virus.  
 
5. What Is to Be Done? 
The best explanation of the political decisions taken to confront the COVID-19 pandemic is not 
that policymakers’ reasons for acting failed to initially cohere with the interests of their 
constituents. The best explanation of the political decisions taken and, correlatively, of the 
decisions not taken, is that policymakers did not know how to effectively pursue the goal that 
they initially shared with their constituents: ignorance distorted their incentives to pursue the 
goal. By and large, as implied by the logical priority of the problem of policymaker ignorance 
over that of the problem of policymaker incentives, policymakers pursued significantly less 
epistemically burdensome goals than mitigating as far as possible overall human suffering due to 
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both COVID-19 and its political aftereffects. With few exceptions, policymakers preferred the 
relatively epistemically simple goal of mitigating only suffering due to the direct health effects of 
the virus, while ignoring the more burdensome goal of also mitigating suffering due to their 
policies. Policymakers lacked the material required to rationally trade off the direct health effects 
of the virus against the socioeconomic (and concomitant indirect health) effects of policies aimed 
at limiting the direct health effects of the virus.12 Understanding that it was beyond their ken and 
control to both save lives and limit the other deleterious health effects of the virus, while also 
preserving traditional economic and other societal norms, policymakers opted to sacrifice (for 
the moment, one hopes) these established conventions.  
Unfortunately, many policymakers were ignorant of knowledge required to deliberately 
realize even the more limited goal of limiting deaths and other sufferings from the direct health 
effects of the virus. From the array of potential policies aimed at limiting suffering from the 
health effects of the virus (while ignoring the economic and other societal aftereffects of their 
policies), policymakers tended to opt for the blunt – and comparatively epistemically simple – 
policy of economic lockdown and compulsory stay-at-home orders, rather than more 
epistemically challenging policies that would have required the identification and protection of 
uniquely susceptible patient populations. Faced with the epistemically burdensome problem of 
avoiding the consequences of admitting the failure of their past policy decisions, many 
policymakers continue to pursue such policies, despite the emerging body of evidence of their 
ineffectiveness.  
                                                        
12 For a preliminary, if only partial, comparison of relevant costs and benefits, see Jenkins, 
Sikora, and Dolan (2021) 
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We have pointed to a problem and argued for its fundamentality in political (indeed, in all 
human) decision-making. However, we have said nothing about what should be done about the 
problem. Of course, nothing of a normative nature can be inferred from the positive analysis in 
isolation, but, if we accept as more or less universal the twin assumptions that minimizing 
overall human suffering is good and that we ought to pursue the good as far as possible, various 
normative possibilities suggest themselves.  
First, political analysis should proceed not from the assumption that policymakers and 
constituents are at motivational loggerheads, but from the assumption that policymakers may 
lack relevant knowledge and abilities (know-how) that constituent-minded policymaking 
requires, and that their epistemic burdens serve to determine the extent of their constituent-
mindedness. As we have put the point elsewhere, apropos of David Hume’s famous maxim to 
treat policymakers as knaves, “All [policymakers] are ignoramuses; the nature and extent of their 
ignorance serves to determine the extent of their knavery” (Scheall 2019, p. 43).  
Second, it would seem reasonable to ask why policymakers are widely believed to be 
responsible for realizing goals that ignorance may well prevent them from deliberately realizing, 
like minimizing overall suffering from both a disease and their responses to it. How is it that, 
over the course of the history of political constitutions, policymakers have come to be assigned 
responsibilities that seem beyond their ken and control? There would seem to be a case, 
therefore, for revisiting the question of the social goals pursuit of which is best assigned to 
deliberate political action and those more effectively realized through spontaneous forces. In this 
project, political inquiry of the kind suggested in the previous paragraph, political analysis that 
starts from the assumption that policymakers may lack relevant knowledge and abilities – that it 
A Case Study in the Problem of Policymaker Ignorance: Political Responses to COVID-19 
Scott Scheall and Parker Crutchfield 
Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft forthcoming in Cosmos + Taxis 
 
 22 
is always an open question in every decision context whether, in what relevant ways, and to what 
extent, policymakers are ignorant – would seem to be essential. 
The nature and extent of policymaker ignorance with respect to constituent-minded goals 
like minimizing overall suffering from both some public-health danger and political efforts to 
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